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Chapter 1
Introduction
1. Background
History of Virtualization – When virtualization was first conceived in 1960s, it was known to programmers
and researchers as time sharing. It was Christopher Strachey, Professor of Computation at Oxford University
who coined the term in his paper “Time Sharing in Large Fast Computers” wherein he was referring to what
he called multi-programming. According to this technique, while one programmer is developing a program
on his console and another programmer debugging his, there would be no usual wait for peripherals. Multiprogramming and similar ideas began to drive innovation which has resulted in several computers that have
been brought to existence like the Atlas and IBM's M44/44X.
Atlas computer was one of the first supercomputers of the early 1960s that used concepts such as time
sharing, multi-programming, as well as shared peripheral control. Atlas was one of the fastest computers of
its time partially due to a separation of OS processes from the executing user programs. The component
called the supervisor managed the computer's processing time, and was passed extracodes, thus helping in
the management of the user program's instructions. This was considered as the birth of the hypervisor or
virtual machine monitor (VMM).
IBM spearheaded the M44/44X Project at the IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center. The architecture
which was similar to that of Atlas computer led to coining of the term virtual machines. The IBM 7044
(M44) scientific computer was supported by several simulated 7044 virtual machines, using hardware and
software, virtual memory, and multi-programming.
What is Virtualization? - Virtualization means to create a virtual version of a device or resource, such as a
server, storage device, network or even an operating system where the framework divides the resource into
one or more execution environments. In other words, virtualization is a framework or methodology of
dividing the resources of a computer into multiple execution environments, by applying one or more
concepts or technologies such as hardware and software partitioning, time-sharing, partial or complete
machine simulation, emulation, quality of service, and many others.
1

Figure 1. Simple representation of virtualize system
Why is Virtualization important? - Live migration has many advantages. It gives the user flexibility and
options to take down a working server during the day, rather than at night or on weekends, upgrade the
operating system, apply patches, etc., then bring it back up again during regular working hours. This is a
very useful concept, for instance, operations managers in data centers look at where they have heavy
workloads and move virtual machines around so that the cooling system isn't working excessively hard
trying to keep just part of the data center at the right temperature.
Following are some representative reasons for and benefits of virtualization:
•

Virtual machines can be used to consolidate the workloads of several underutilized servers to fewer
machines, perhaps a single machine (server consolidation).

•

Related benefits are savings on hardware, environmental costs, management, and administration of
the server infrastructure.

•

The need to run legacy applications is served well by virtual machines.

•

Virtual machines can be used to provide secure, isolated sandboxes for running non-trusted
applications. Virtualization is an important concept in building secure computing platforms.
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•

Virtual machines can be used to create operating systems, or execution environments with resource
limits, and given the right schedulers, resource guarantees.

•

Virtual machines can provide the illusion of hardware, or hardware configuration that you do not
have (such as SCSI devices, multiple processors, etc)

•

Virtual machines can be used to run multiple operating systems simultaneously: different versions, or
even entirely different systems, which can be on hot standby.

•

Virtual machines allow for powerful debugging and performance monitoring.

•

Virtual machines can isolate what they run, so they provide fault and error containment. Virtual
machines make software easier to migrate, thus aiding application and system mobility.

•

Virtual machines are great tools for research and academic experiments.

•

Virtualization can enable existing operating systems to run on shared memory multiprocessors.

•

Virtual machines can be used to create arbitrary test scenarios, and can lead to some very
imaginative, effective quality assurance.

•

Virtualization can make tasks such as system migration, backup, and recovery easier and more
manageable.

•

Virtualization can be an effective means of providing binary compatibility.

•

Virtualization is fun.

Types of Virtual Machines:
1. Process VMs
2. System VMs

3

Figure 2. Types of Virtual Machines
Virtual Machine Applications:
1. Emulation – This allows mix and match cross-platform portability.
2. Optimization – This provides platform-specific performance improvement. It is usually done with
emulation.
3. Replication – This allows having multiple virtual machines on a single platform.
4. Composition – Similar to replication but forms more complex but flexible systems.
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Figure 3. Virtual Machine Applications
Performance Goals in Migration:

•

Migration of Virtual Machines helps minimize ‘Downtime’.

•

One of the major performance goals in migration is reduction of total migration time of virtual
machines.

•

It helps if there is no interference with normal system activity which is an important goal of
migration.

•

To minimize network activity is also a performance goal in migration.

Business Challenge:
Initially virtualization was embraced as a method to consolidate multiple server applications onto fewer
servers so as to increase utilization and reduce energy requirements. Today, IT organizations are looking
beyond just server consolidation. Today virtualization is being used to create more dynamic data centers.
Live migration dynamically allocates and balances computing resources and thus helps us align the
infrastructure with enterprise-level business goals. Live migration performs migrations without actually
interrupting the services the Virtual Machines are providing and thereby reducing the additional work
usually involved with migrating Virtual Machines. Traditionally, the extra work involves first shutting down
the applications, then moving the Virtual Machines to new servers, and finally restarting the Virtual
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Machines and the applications that were shutdown. So by eliminating this additional work, live migration
helps improve flexibility and efficiency in managing data center resources.
Advanced data centers are benefitted by live migration by use of following capabilities:
1. Dynamic Load balancing
2. No VM downtime during maintenance
Dynamic Load Balancing:
Dynamic load balancing will change the mapping of jobs to resources at any point, but there may be a cost
associated with the changes. There are two main types of dynamic load balancing algorithms: preemptive
and non-preemptive. In a preemptive algorithm, the mapping of jobs to physical resources may change while
a job is running whereas with the non-preemptive algorithms, once a job has started the physical resources
assigned to that job cannot change. Dynamic load balancing redistributes tasks during execution which
typically moves tasks from heavily loaded processors to lightly loaded processors. Also the dynamic load
balancing algorithm can be centralized or distributed. In centralized scheme, all information is sent to a
single decision-making agent that decides when load balancing will occur and which tasks will be moved. In
distributed dynamic load balancing, load information is not shared globally and all processors take part in
deciding when load-balancing occurs and which tasks will be migrated. One major advantage of dynamic
load balancing is that the run-time behavior of the system does not need to be known in advance. While
these algorithms are very good at maximizing utilization of all resources, there is a run time overhead
associated with gathering information and transferring tasks to different processors.
No VM downtime during maintenance:
When enterprise-level servers need maintenance and if they are hardware-based physical servers, they need
to be shutdown and hence due to this downtime there may be loss of business and/or inconvenience to users
and clients. But by using live migration, enterprises can perform server maintenance like software upgrades
without experiencing VM downtime, as the VMs can be moved from the primary host server to secondary
server before shutdown or reboot.

6

2. Motivation
Live migration of virtual machines (VMs) is the process of transitioning a VM from one virtual machine
monitor (VMM) to another without halting the guest operating system, often between distinct physical
machines, has opened new opportunities in computing. It allows a clean separation between hardware and
software, and facilitates fault management, load balancing, and low-level system maintenance. Implemented
by several existing virtualization products, live migration also aids in aspects such as high availability
services, transparent mobility and consolidated management.
While virtualization and live migration enable important new functionality, the combination introduces
novel security challenges. A virtual machine monitor that incorporates a vulnerable implementation of live
migration functionality may expose both the guest and host operating system to attack and result in a
compromise of integrity.
Given the large and increasing market for virtualization technology, a comprehensive understanding of
virtual machine migration security is essential. So the motivation for my setup is to create a test environment
that is suitable for this experiment and analyze the security implications in case of exploitation of Live
Migration of Virtual Machines.
3. Objective
Applying published dynamic load balancing algorithms to virtual machines and the experimental study of
security implications by exploiting Live Migration of Virtual Machines, is the central idea of my thesis.
I am primarily interested in answering these following questions:

•

“What is the overhead of load balancing using specified policy engine?”

•

“What happens when Live Migration of Virtual Machines is exploited? “

•

“What is the effect of these security implications on the various Performance factors on which Live
Migration depends?”

•

“How does exploiting the security affect migration-enabled dynamic load balancing?”

•

“Can there be effective Resource Isolation in case of security lapse?”

•

“What exactly conspires when the process of Live Migration is exploited?”
7

4. Scope
The scope of my thesis research is essentially to use Live VM migration for dynamic load balancing or
scheduling. This experimentation will determine workload hotspots in physical environment and through use
of effective Live Migration process; it will try to carry out resource profiling. By carrying out effective
profiling, this thesis research will be able to determine how much of each resource needs to be allocated to a
VM. To understand exactly why process migration would not work in such scenarios and better understand
Live VM Migration, this thesis will try to provide requisite incites as to which model is most appropriate for
automatic load balancing for virtual machine infrastructure based on resource consumption. The security
implications of exploiting the process of migration may end in unexpected results or results that are not
noticeable. The scope of my thesis research is identifying these results and the causes for them.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
Virtual Machine Monitors were developed to better utilize the expensive mainframe hardware and its
resources so that multiple applications and servers could coexist on the same physical host. The motivation
for research in this field today is increasing dramatically as more hardware is developed with built in native
virtualization support and more software solutions appear.
Reliability and redundancy are key features in modern virtualization technology. Mission critical
applications do not tolerate downtime and corporations can quickly lose money if their availability is
affected by maintenance, hardware- or software failure or malicious activity. Virtual machine technology
deals with this challenge with just simply moving the virtual machine(s) from the physical host that needs
maintenance onto other server hardware while the virtual machine is running and maintaining service
availability. With the virtual machines running elsewhere there is no harm in doing a server shutdown in
order to do maintenance quick and undisturbed.
A virtual infrastructure can utilize live server migration to move running production servers to other network
hosts in order to do, for instance scheduled maintenance or replace faulty hardware. This makes the network
setup very fault-tolerant and eliminates any maintenance or management downtime. There are several ways
of presenting a virtual hardware layer, and the many Virtual Machine Monitors solve the problems in
different ways. As stated by Christopher Clark, et al, migrating an entire OS and all of its applications as one
unit allows us to avoid many of the difficulties faced by process-level migration approaches. In particular
the narrow interface between a virtualized OS and the virtual machine monitor (VMM) makes it easy avoid
the problem of ‘residual dependencies’. Live migration of virtual machines allows a separation of concerns
between the users and operator of a data center or cluster. Christopher Clark, et al, have addressed the
importance of using live OS migration [1] as a powerful tool for cluster administrators, allowing separation
of hardware and software considerations, and consolidating clustered hardware into a single coherent
management domain. The idea of migrating OS instances including the applications to alternative
9

machine(s), freeing the original machine for maintenance, is central to their implementation of highperformance migration support for XEN. Their implementation is very significant and suggests an efficient
way to enable rapid movement of interactive workloads within clusters and data centers. It is also important
to know that resources do also migrate which may depend on resource to process binding – by identifiers
like specific website, ftp server; or by type like printers, local devices. Resources can also migrate
depending on type of attachments – fixed resources like local devices, communication end points; or
resources moved only at high costs like databases. This current research has helped understand the
implementation by Clark, et al by furthering the research with support of Resource Allocation but using
VMWare technology which is vMotion.
The practice of dedicating one server to each service or application is costly and precious IT-resources are
stretched thin procuring, provisioning and maintaining a growing number of under-utilized servers. Business
continuity requires continuous server uptime and meeting this demand is costly in terms of redundancy,
management and maintenance. The solution could be a virtual infrastructure. In the research paper by
Wesley Emeneker, et al; they implement a system of virtual machines [2] to increase cluster utilization by
enabling job forwarding and spanning, that flexibly allow software environment changes, and effectively
sandbox users and processes from each other and the system. The authors here have created an initial
implementation of DVC model that has reduced the queue wait and turnaround time, and increased job
throughput. They have implemented a model that performs forwarding and spanning with VMs which can
improve cluster utilization, increase throughput, and decrease turnaround time. Similar to the DVC model, a
model that also improves cluster utilization by reducing downtime time through implementation of dynamic
cluster reservation supported by live migration of VMs would facilitate efficient vacation of resources using
scheduling algorithm (load balancing algorithm) so as to fully utilize resources. This further research which
was based on the idea of utilizing one such published scheduling algorithm provided by VMWare and as
known in virtual world as Distributed Resource Scheduler (DRS) that automatically detects workload
hotspots and schedules resource allocation across VMs and migrates them to underutilized servers was
successful in determining when workloads occur and when and where the virtual machines are migrated.
10

It is important to detect workload hotspots which arise if the demand exceeds allocated capacity. An
efficient way to overcome this is to build a framework for dynamic allocation of resources that can be
adjusted based on workload. This framework must be secure and not allowed to be compromised.
Virtualization which is one of the hottest concepts these days can be utilized to make sure that resources are
used more efficiently as it has the capability to adjust resource provisioning while maintaining isolation.
Live VM Migration is a virtualization concept that can be used to create such a model.
Furthermore, as described in the paper by Marvin McNett, et al (2007); they describe the implementation of
Usher [3] as a cluster management system. The system is designed to substantially reduce the administrative
burden of managing cluster resources while simultaneously improving the ability of users to request, control,
and customize their resources and computing environment, enabling administrators to choose how their VM
environment will be configured and the policies under which they will be managed. Usher multiplexes
individual VMs on available physical machine hardware and allows creating and use of machines according
to the needs rather than according to assigned physical resources by decoupling logical machine resources
from physical machines. Now to have a similar model that does dynamic allocation of resources and a model
that performs automatic computation to determine which physical resources are overloaded and then by
allocating resources to relevant VMs, perform VM scheduling to migrate VMs to appropriate underutilized
server, would be an approach that administrators would look forward to implementing as a model for their
VM migration policy and so that idea was experimented in my research using the concept of DRS.
When we discussing the resource management model, we need to consider which portions of resource slots
can be bound either to virtual resources or to overhead associated with the creation or maintenance of those
virtual resources. Borja Sotomayor, et al; in their implementation of Virtual Resource Management Model
[4] (2007) have implemented a model that manages the overhead of using VMs to minimize the negative
effects on performance and leverage virtualization features that could increase utilization of physical
resources. They have suggested use of multiple techniques like Draining, Backfilling and Suspend-Resume
to evaluate scheduling accuracy and efficiency. While their implementation was focused on deployment of
VM images, the current research based on Live Migration of VMs evaluates these factors but by simply
11

measuring the utilization of resources and allocating them to appropriate VMs. Sotomayor, et al, have tested
their model against real as well artificial workloads which will be done for the current study too, not based
on user requests for virtual workspace but for performance testing of the physical servers that host these
resources. Virtual Resource Management model was more or less based on models conceived earlier like
“Virtuoso and VSched” [5] (2005) and “Shirako” [6] (2006). These models are quite similar to the Virtual
Resource Management Model wherein the authors created a virtual workspace from scratch but with certain
assumptions like no preparation overhead during resource leasing in case of virtual clusters were being
deployed on multiple physicals clusters and no deployment overhead while co-scheduling interactive and
batch workloads on individuals machines. While these models missed out or deliberately not consider
overheads (preparation overhead as in case of Virtuoso and deployment overhead as in case of Shirako), the
current research considers overheads due to Live Migration of VMs while resource reservation takes place
based on utilization of physical servers like for instance variation of memory load and network overload
factor which was studied and researched by carrying out tests that show results that are used during dynamic
load balancing.
While physical machine state is protected by hardware, virtual machine state is protected by
VMM/hypervisor and software attacks are perpetrated due to weak VMM isolation. Full VM state is
exposed to the network during migration as there is no encryption involved. Security concerns range from
authentication to confidentiality to isolation. In the paper [8] by Jon Oberheide et al, they have discussed
about the different classes of threat to the Live Migration process. They have given a detailed report of their
investigation of possible attack classes during the live migration process. A compromised system inside a
network employing live migrations can facilitate un-trusted access to migrating Virtual Machines. While
they have discussed different attack classes, they have not elaborated on the effects of these attacks or
security implications over the migration process and (specifically) the concept of dynamic load balancing
facilitated by Live Migration of VMs. This current thesis research identifies the effects of the security lapse
on the migration process and specially, the effect on the performance factors of virtual machines. I have
used some of the attack classes coupled with VMWare technology and tried to exploit and stress test
12

vMotion using varying memory values and network load. This research has used MiTM as the major attack
class along with host of other attacks like sniffing or gathering data; fingerprinting VMWare products and
brute force attack to retrieve hypervisor login information.
Resource utilization in expensive servers is often at 25% average. As mentioned earlier the practice of
assigning one application or service to its own physical server can be costly. A virtual infrastructure
improves resource utilization and high priced servers can be justified. Administrators can look at their
servers as a big pool of resources and map virtual machines with running services to any part of this
resource pool without having to think about available resources on a specific host. This in turn also prevents
the proliferation of physical servers. Espen Braastad (2006) describes the need for open source tools capable
of providing migration of VMs as a method for virtualization and repair. [7] He describes the use of
‘Heartbeat’ as high availability software that seamlessly migrates VMs between physical nodes in the
cluster. This paper evaluates migration of VMs using Heartbeat based on impact on TCP and UDP services
and also the users of high availability services. The core discussion presented here is the results related to
failures in case of migration and effect on network performance. While network performance is very
important for administrators, it would be a significant measurement to test the migration traffic. Evaluating
this migration traffic was a part of the current research so as to determine the most appropriate model for
resources to be migrated using VMs across the network which was done using VMWare measurement tools
provided by Veeam coupled with VMWare’s inbuilt virtual infrastructure components. The effect of
exploiting the migration traffic can be evaluated and to determine what transpires in the network pipe during
the migration process is an integral part of this current thesis research which showed how the total migration
time is affected and what is the change in migration delay as compared with varying values of memory and
migration delay comparison study between migration of VMs in sequence against parallel.
A literature study by Andre van Cleeff, et al. [19] has details and charts of security impact per feature group
that includes hardware, VM, VMM, VMMM, emergent. These feature groups have been weighed against
various exploits and vulnerabilities which affect one or more properties like confidentiality, integrity,
availability, non-repudiation and authenticity. My research uses some of these features to test and validate
13

the vulnerabilities like for instance data integrity during vMotion when data which may be financial records
or otherwise are seen in cleartext just by sniffing or MiTM attack.
Furthermore, Ming Zhao, et al. [21] in their “Experimental study of virtual Machine migration in support of
reservation of Cluster Resources”, has provided us with an experimental model which can predict
performance of VM migration process. While their experimental model was not based on VMWare
vMotion, mine was. I was able see similar results using scenarios from their experimental study but for
VMWare vMotion while theirs was based on stop-copy-resume migration strategy.
Administrators who work in virtualized domain [20] have tried and tested exploits that compromise such
systems like using MiTM attacks, stealing guest VMs, credential harvester attack, taking control of
management servers and console. So I have used these instances and methodologies as described in the
world of hacker or for an ethical tester – penetration tester, to understand the logs and performance
parameters of a breach. My results show graphical representations of the timeframe during the vMotion
breach or virtualization exploit. While the scope of their might be larger as compared to mine, I have tried to
encapsulate various factors related to VM migration and the threats related to it.
Exploits related to resources when network is flooded is a case wherein I tried to chalk out a result that tells
me how the live migration is affected even if there is no attempt to steal or corrupt data. My research is an
attempt to get a behind-the-scenes glimpse of live migration exploit or stress testing.

The above reviewed literature presents different oversights to resource allocation and virtualization concepts
along with possible security loopholes. Each of the them have their significant problem statements that the
authors have tried to overcome and present a model or infrastructure to create an efficient methodology. The
current research idea will be based on some of these concepts and support or prove them in an alternative
approach. The current research approach will use some of the ideas from these models and act as a guide for
working towards defining a methodology that overcomes the problems encountered by these previous
approaches.
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Chapter 3
Live Virtual Machine Migration
What is Live Virtual Machine Migration?
To put the answer in most simplest terms would be “transfer of VM/s from one physical machine to another
with minimal or no service downtime”.

Figure 4. Virtual Machine Migration
Migration Types - There are generally two basic types of migration which may be categorized as pre-copy
and post-copy.
Pre-copy

Post-copy
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Following are some specific migration techniques [9]:

Stop-and-Copy Migration - This type of migration is non-live migration. This type of migration results in
VM downtime. This works well for VMs under maintenance. The only positive aspect of this type of
migration is that it provides a baseline to compare the total number of pages transferred and the total
migration time.
Following are the details regarding stop-and-copy migration:
-

The source VM (one that has to be migrated) is stopped (shutdown).

-

All the pages are copied over the network.

-

Finally the destination VM is started.

-

This migration type has longest service downtime.

-

This migration type has the shortest migration duration.

Demand Migration – This type of migration is based on post-copy based live VM migration.
Following are the details regarding demand migration:
-

Initially all the critical and essential OS structures are copied over the network.

-

Then the destination VM is started.

-

Every page fault triggers copy of those pages over the network.

-

This migration type has shortest service downtime.

-

This migration type has the longest migration duration.

Iterative Pre-Copy Migration – This type of migration combines pre-copy migration with a bounded
iterative push phase. This migration type also involves a very short stop-and-copy phase.
Following are the details regarding iterative pre-copy migration:
-

Iteratively copies pages over the network from source to destination.

-

Keeps copying pages until a particular threshold is reached, then stops source VM and further copies
all the remaining pages, before finally starting the destination VM.

-

This kind of migration equally balances migration duration and service downtime.

16

Figure 5. Migration Techniques
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Chapter 4
Security Risks – Holistic View
Companies which network their computers for cost-saving purposes by using live virtual machine migration
are vulnerable to hackers/attackers. Since live virtual machine migration is relatively new, allowing virtual
machines to migrate between servers with little or no service downtime and thus help load balance across
several servers; the security of live virtual machine migration has not been researched upon extensively.
It is possible that hackers/attackers compromise the integrity of a virtual machine's operating system during
live migration because even though virtualization-based companies have created software that makes it easy
for reducing server downtime and equalize loads when there is fluctuations across the servers, these software
do not encrypt the data (virtual machines in this case) as it migrates from one server to other server.
While a short-term fix would be to isolate network used for migration from other network traffic or have the
data encrypted by using some reputed hardware encryption software, there is an urgent need to educate
companies and raise awareness about this vulnerability.
To understand how the security of virtual environment can be compromised, it was essential to think like an
attacker. So this chapter provides an overview of types of attacks and how they work and gives the point
view of a Penetration Tester, hacker or disgruntled employee.
Common Types of Attacks
1. Buffer Overflows
This class of attack involves data being written into a buffer which is greater than the allocated space of that
buffer, resulting in corruption of memory inside a running process. The reason behind such an attack could
be to either halt that running process or call an injected malicious code as a result of buffer overflow.
2. Heap Overflows
This attack class occurs in heap data area and is a type of buffer overflow. As in case with buffer overflow,
attacker supplies the application with data that is larger than the size of the chunk (data blocks in heap)
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which causes the overwriting of metadata of the succeeding chunk. Again, the attacker data may contain
malicious code.
3. Web-based Attacks

o Fake Certificate Injection
An attacker acts as a man-in the middle between the website and the computer trying to access that website.
By using this type of attack, the attacker, much like a proxy server, after taking requests from an
unsuspecting user, makes some (possibly) malicious changes and forwards the changed request to the target.
But since the query has been tampered with, the user gets back a new location that the attacker wants
him/her to go to.

o Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
Using this type of computer security vulnerability, an attacker (malicious web user) can inject malicious
code into the web applications. Such vulnerability is usually used by the attacker to bypass access controls,
for phishing attacks and browser exploits. Type 1 XSS or non-persistent is a reflected vulnerability which
shows up when server-side scripts instantly use the data provided by web clients without validating the
received data which can allow insertion of client-side code into dynamic web pages. Type 2 XSS or
persistent is a second order attack. This type of vulnerability occurs when the data provided by the user to
the web application is stored persistently (in database or file systems), and is displayed on to the web page
without being encoded using HTML.
4. SQL Injection
When an input provided to a web application in interpreted as a SQL input and the application replies back
with a failure message, the attacker is able to realize that the target application is vulnerable to SQL
injection. In this type of attack, the attacker tries to get around the filters by testing out the weaknesses of the
filters by querying the filters persistently. So basically, SQL injection takes place when data is inputted to
the SQL query engine that is not expected by the web user.
5. Layer 2 Attacks

o Content Addressable Memory (CAM) Table or MAC Flooding
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CAM table is simply Dynamic Content Addressable Memory on an Ethernet switch and is responsible for
correctly echoing out the frames out of relevant port or else the switch is no different from a hub. If an
attacker gets control of any device that is connected to the Ethernet switch, he/she can attack the CAM table
by MAC flooding which is vulnerability in the design of the switch when the switch has no more space to
record MAC address to Port mapping during its learning stage. So as a result, switch loses its identity and
begins forwarding any received frames out of all ports, like a hub.

o Double Encapsulation Attacks
Such attacks are common in VLAN environments and so they are also referred to as VLAN hopping attacks.
The transmitted frames are tagged with a “VTag” identifier so as to forward these frames to wrong VLAN.

o Multicast Brute Force Attacks
This attack uses the switch’s vulnerability to a storm of multicast frames. When the switch receives such a
storm of multicast frames rapidly, it will try to constrain the traffic to the original VLAN but failing to do so
results in frame leaks to other VLANs which may potentially be malicious.

o Spanning Tree Attacks
Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) is responsible in avoiding switching or bridging loops that cause broadcast
storms, which can bring the L2 networks to its knees. In STP, path redundancy is enabled to prevent
network loops by assigning ports in forwarding or blocked state, all of which is done by use of election
based on MAC address value. So in spanning tree attacks, attacker can force an alternate election which may
be rigged by making its MAC value higher than root bridge value and hence compromising the entire
network.

o Random Frame Attacks
This attack involves attacker randomly varying the fields of a packet without changing the source and
destination addresses. So the attacker is able to send out unwanted malicious traffic to Private VLANs from
untrustworthy devices.
6. Layer 3 Non-router Attacks
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Attacker predominantly uses ARP cache poisoning so a mode of attack for Layer 3 non-router. During ARP
broadcast, the protocol believes in anything that it is told even though it may not have asked for that
information. The attacker can send out ARP cache update with malicious information by forging the
contents causing the victim’s machine to expire its own cache. The attacker is able to sniff, modify and drop
packets by poisoning the default gateway and victim’s machine by making them believe that his is the
requested machine. So basically the attack is directed towards TCP/IP V4 protocol stack which might
require replacement.
7. DNS Attacks

o DNS Cache Poisoning Attack
This attack involves changing the values in the cache that contain previous lookup requests. So by
controlling the name resolutions of the sites, the attacker could send unsuspecting users to fake sites without
the users knowing the difference.

o Pharming Using the Host File
While this is similar to DNS poisoning, the attacker makes changes to the host file rather than the DNS
server. Since TCP/IP protocol consults the host file for resolving DNS names to IP addresses, by any
changes to this file, the user may get redirected to fake site even though he/she is typing the correct URL.
8. Layer 3 Routing Attacks

o Route Table Poisoning
Route table poisoning is inserting fake routes in victim router’s routing table by using outdated routing
protocols like RIPv1 or IGRP that do not require authentication.

o Source Routed Packets
In this type of attack, the attacker changes the information in the source routing table of the packet itself
which causes the packet to select its own path to destination. So basically, the attacker modifies or poisons
each router.
9. Man in the Middle Attack (MiTM)
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If the integrity of the channel used for communication between two devices or parties is not ensured along
with the verification of the identity of the parties at both ends of this channel, then MiTM attack can easily
be put into action. MiTM examples include standard MiTM Arp cache Poison attack, SSL attack and iSCSI
MiTM. Such an attack is used to accomplish the following:

Impersonate – Attacker tries to impersonate the victim for intercepting messages and send fake certificate to
sender.

Eavesdrop – Attacker tries to intercept and listen in on traffic by forcing it pass by a hodgepodge enabled
NIC.

Modify – Attacker can modify the message if he is able to decrypt the message to plain text.
Replay of Messages – Similar to network injection attacks, the attacker who is able to listen in on the traffic
can change the sequence of the packets making up the message by doctoring the sequence and hence causing
the replay of packets due to incorrect sequencing.

Prevent Clock Synchronization – Attacker may prevent synchronization of sender and receiver clocks so as
to listen in on the traffic as the synchronized clocks make it difficult to snoop around.
Organizations, either big or small, never want their live systems to be interrupted if they are using
virtualization technologies as that would defeat the whole purpose of high-availability features. But such
organizations do fail to understand the security risks involved in live migration of virtual machines.

While any and all of the above mentioned vulnerabilities and attack classes would work in creating
operational hazards with respect to the virtualized environment, there are certain known virtualization
system attacks which have been documented. [10]
1. Management Server attacks – The management console can be exploited to gain login information
and hence eventually access to the management server. Also these attacks can allow attacker to
change privileges and gain elevated privileges.
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2. Admin VM attacks – These attacks result in Denial of Service resulting in crashing admin VM.
Passwords stored in cleartext can be obtained easily and which can lead to attackers bypassing
authentication.
3. Guest VM attacks – Similar to admin VM attack, this attack can include gaining increased privileges,
crashing VM, executing rogue code with admin permissions.
4. Hypervisor attacks – Hypervisor can crash and attackers can easily jump between guests VMs.
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Chapter 5
Design and Implementation
The goal of this study was to test the impact security exploits has on a virtualized environment within a
typical (simulated) network environment by using consistent, mixed workload simulation.
To accomplish the goals stated above, I created a simulated datacenter consisting of Windows Server 2003
Standard Edition which was the domain controller, two ESX hosts running at at least two virtual machines
(VM) each and a virtual machine for VMware vCenter Management Server hosted on Windows Server 2003
Standard Edition. All these servers were the upper level Virtual machines as shown in the generic view
below. Each ESX host piggy-backed multiple VMs which were eventually nested VMs.

Figure 6. Design Architecture

Being able to run VMware ESX 4.0 and higher under VMware Workstation as a VM, gives IT professional
great flexibility. This enables them to test and experiment with products. While the approach is similar to
installing and running ESX server in standalone environment, the differences lie in hardware requirements.
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Hardware Used
I used three laptops for my testing purpose. Following are the configurations for those laptops:
Hewlett Packard (HP) Pavilion v6000 laptop computer had the following specification:

•

Intel Core 3i M370 2.40GHz CPU

•

4GB RAM

•

Windows 7 Home Premium 32-bit

Lenovo R400 laptop computer had the following specification:

•

Intel Mobile Core 2 Duo P8700 2.53GHz CPU

•

6GB RAM

•

Windows 7 Professional 64-bit

Dell Inspiron 8600 laptop computer had the following specification:

•

Intel Pentium M Processor 1.60GHz CPU

•

1GB RAM

•

Windows Server 2003 R2 Standard Edition

Software Used
•

VMWare ESXi 4.0 Releasebuild-171294 [16]

•

VMware Workstation 6.5.1 (Build 126130) [15]

•

OpenFiler NSA ver 2.3 (Virtual SAN for shared storage - free) [11]

•

BackTrack 4 (Penetration testing CD) and Wireshark (Sniffer and Analyzer) [12]

•

Veeam Monitor and Reporter(Management tools for VMWare infrastructure – free) [13][14]

•

VMware Workstation 6.5.1 (Build 126130) [15]
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Figure 7. ESXi Host 1 - Rochester (10.0.0.84)

Figure 8. ESXi Host 2 - Milan (10.0.0.85)
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Figure 9. Shared Storage – VSAN (10.0.0.88)

Figure 10. vSphere Server – VCENTER (10.0.0.10)
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Figure 11. Attacker – Backtrack (10.0.0.15)

28

Chapter 6
Results – Research and Testing
Starting off with testing the security loopholes in live migration of VMs, I chose the VMWare technology
and hence the exploitation of Vmotion which is a patented VMWare technology. Using the design
architecture that I mentioned in the Chapter 3, I setup two ESXi hosts which were version 4.0 (Build
171294). I setup a third computer which acted as the vCenter server (management server). I proceeded by
creating VMs on each of these hosts which were primarily unix/linux based. Below shown is the layout of
the vcenter server which has been aptly named as “VCENTER”. There is a datacenter named “Thesis” with
a cluster (Melvin) of ESXi Hosts, VMs and templates. Also the Datastore view shows the two local storage
called ‘Local1’ belonging to “10.0.0.84” and ‘Local2’ belonging to “10.0.0.85”. VSAN is the virtual shared
storage that has the storage limit of 200 Gb which seemed to serve well for this research.

Figure 12. vCenter View
Speaking of security, by default, the VMotion encryption is disabled and most system administrators fail to
realize the consequence of that setting assuming that organization firewall would protect against all external
threats. Based on the default vCenter settings, I left the encryption disabled.
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Figure 13. vCenter Server settings window
Technically speaking, vMotion traffic should be isolated which means that it is recommended that we use a
separate physical switch or isolate vMotion traffic with a VLAN. The greatest drawback of vMotion is that
any related traffic (memory contents of a VM) is transmitted in clear text. There is always a concern as to
someone could sniff the network and eventually get access to the memory contents of the VM.

Non-Live Virtual Machine Migration
Initially, exploitation was carried out with power-off VMs so as to compare results with results of exploits
with powered-on VMs. It was discovered that if VMs are powered-off, any exploits that were carried out
were futile with no loss to application data or virtual machine except in case wherein exploits against VMs
involving stealing of guests entirely which meant copying VM files and changing them and pushing them
back to the shared store.
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Following exploits carried out using the VASTO plugin in Metasploit 3 from BackTrack 4 are related to
gaining host based information like and login credentials.
Figure 14. Metasploit Shell console

Figure 15. ‘VMWARE_VERSION’ exploit:

As we see that using this plugin, I was able to extract the versions and build of the ESXi hosts. Using this
plugin, I should be able to fingerprint most of the VMware products.
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Figure 16a. ‘VMWARE_LOGIN’ exploit:

Using this plugin, I was able to brute force login information from the ESXi hosts. Like get the username
and password information which have been blanked out as shown below.
Figure 16b. ‘VMWARE_LOGIN’ exploit:
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Live Virtual Machine Migration
Now to illustrate the important part of this thesis, that is based on Live Migration of Virtual machines.
Trying to exploit and observe this type of migration process is the main purpose of this thesis paper.

Test Method 1 (using Wireshark)
During testing, I created a scenario in where I wanted to sniff and analyze VM guest memory during the
transition phase known as VMotion. Taking the advantage of the default encryption mode (=disabled) of
VMotion, I initially used only Wireshark (formerly Ethereal) which is an sniffing tool, to capture and
analyze packets created on the network due the transfer of VM from one ESXi host to another. The VM that
I used was a linux-based Operating System called as “Damn Small Linux” aptly named as DSL in the
vCenter. I setup the VM Portgroup to accept promiscuous mode where the Wireshark is running.

Figure 17. Wireshark settings
In DSL, I opened up a terminal session and simply wrote onto a file (saved it as a text document) using the
‘CAT’ command. This was done while sniffer was doing its job. I “VMotioned” the guest VM (DSL) from
one ESXi host to other (10.0.0.84  10.0.0.85). When Vmotion was complete, I stopped the sniffer and
analyzed the sniff wherein I noticed that I was able to see my entire operation including the commands that I
inputted to create and write a file in the guest VM.
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Figure 18a. Wireshark sniffing results
So continuing on with the test, I enabled VMotion Encryption and selected “Required” over “Best Effort”.
From the research and reading that I have done so far, I am optimistic that the result is going to be the same
and I was correct. Wireshark has still been able to sniff out the TCP data allowing me to see plain text that’s
crossing the network. How can this be? As with any system administrator, thinking that restarting services of
the ESXi host machines and checking if “vCenter.VMotionEncryption” setting was applied correctly, I did
the same but still VMotion remains unencrypted. Is this a bug? Probably so, but after such instances being
reported over past two years VMWare would have been expected to provide a patch. But again not to sound
critical, VMWare has come up with application like vShield to protect VMotion.
While wireshark displayed plain text data passing over the network during VMotion, I was also able to view
other clear text system properties using the TCP stream:
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Figure 18b. Wireshark sniffing results

Test Method 2 (using Backtrack – ARP Poisoning MiTM)
Let me elaborate the exploits that I carried out in such a scenario. Using one of most powerful penetration
testing and hacking utilities provided by BackTrack, certain exploits like gaining ESXi host-based
information like root logins, versions, builds, number of VMs residing on each host, and so forth, was
collected, which is an enormous security risk. Along with the above information that was easily acquired, I
was also able to access VM file structure and hence unleash an exploit called as “Guest Stealer”.
Having conducted these exploits, gave me certain insights to possible loopholes in virtualization security
and so I took the next step as to exploit powered-on VMs while in transit. Since this research was
concentrated towards VMWare appliances, I proceeded to exploit “VMOTION”.
One of the most well-known attacker-victim based scenario is Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack which I
incorporated using ARP poisoning methodology.
MITM attacks are most often attacks against data confidentiality and these attacks run at layer 2. It is easily
possible to execute a MITM in a switched ethernet environment. There are two types of MITM attacks –
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Active and Passive. While active attack involves modifying data packets as they are intercepted, passive
attack is more concentrated towards stealing information in transit without modifying it. Passive attack is
more common MITM as it is easy to execute. I will be demonstrating a passive MITM attack on Vmotion.
I started off by executing an ARP poison on the attacker – 10.0.0.15, using ETTERCAP. The attack wrote
the output to a text file. The victim machines are the two ESXi hosts – 10.0.0.84 and 10.0.0.85.

Figure 19. Metasploit – Ettercap (ARP Poisoning - Start)

The attacker started sniffing on the 10.0.0.0/24 network but specifically for data exchange between the ESXi
hosts Rochester (10.0.0.84) and Milan (10.0.0.85). I proceeded to write data onto a file on the VM that I
chose to migrate in live state.
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Figure 20. VM data preparation before Live Migration
I saved this data to the file using ‘cat’ command. Then I proceeded to perform live migration of the VM
(DSL) from 10.0.0.84 to 10.0.0.85 using Vmotion as shown below.

Figure 21. Live VM Migration
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The process of live migration took less than about a minute to complete which was extended making me
believe that the MITM attack had something to do with it. I was able to observe this as I compared the first
method using wireshark with this current attempt by using ARP poisoning. While the data travelled directly
from source to destination in first case and wireshark sniffed packets on the network; using MITM, TCP
packets were first intercepted by attacker (10.0.0.15) and then forwarded to destination. Following graphics
show the prolonged time taken by VMotion during MITM as observed based on various machine properties.

Figure 22. CPU readings during Migration of DSL
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Figure 23. Memory readings during Migration of DSL

Figure 24. Network readings during Migration of DSL
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I will discuss more about the above observed facts as I proceed. So once, the live migration was completed
successfully, I went back to the attacker and stopped the ARP Poison attack. As you can notice below, the
attacker was kind enough to re-arp the victims back to original state.

Figure 25. Metasploit – Ettercap (ARP Poisoning - Stop)
Now that attacker had sniffed the packets while the Vmotion was in progress; the attacker machine
(10.0.0.15) needed to analyze the raw packets. While there are multiple ways to do that like simply open the
output text file that was recording the network data packets and search for the string or numeric data or
conduct a TCP dump from the file based on word count and/or string which would mean scanning each page
or filtering out using a search parameter. I chose to simply use the ‘find’ option to look for the string that I
knew was written on to the file in the VM. Below shown is the complete data that was entered in the VM
and sniffed out during the MITM attack.

Figure 26. ARP Poisoning – Data compromise
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Workload disturbance
In this part of the experiment, I created an artificial workload which would serve as the network traffic
generator from a range of IP ranges on the same network as the ESXi host machine. I generated about 100
billion TCP packets and targeted it towards one of the ESXi host (10.0.0.85).

Figure 27. Network Packet Generator - TCP
I proceeded to check the vCenter and wanted to carry out a migration from that EXi host to other host. But,
this extreme bombardment of network traffic towards the ESXi host caused the host to disconnect from the
vCenter. I had to abandon the traffic generation midway so as to restore connection back between ESXi host
and vCenter.

Figure 28. Result of Artificial network traffic
Let me also mention that before I bombarded the ESXi host with network traffic, I tested to see if that
similar traffic could be tested against the vCenter server. But apart from spikes in network counters like
network usage, transmit rate, receive rate, packets transmitted and packets received, the live migration of
VM was not affected with a migration time ranging between 1-2 minutes.
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Figure 29. Graphical representation for Network traffic conjestion
Moving ahead, I created network traffic while the vMotion was in progress, the same scenario popped up
and the vCenter lost connection with the ESXi host and eventually all the VMs associated with the host, I
waited for about 15minutes for the reaction of the migration process. Hoping for the worst, as I stopped the
artificial traffic towards the ESXi host, the live migration failed as expected but the VM was unharmed. The
VM was still in live state and I was able to access the VM. Performance counters within the vSphere client
for vCenter showed elevated readings for CPU, System and Network. There was no trace of any activity for
Memory and Disk performance counters which points to lost connectivity with storage and no heartbeat
detected otherwise.

Figure 30. vCenter log –VM migration crash due to Host connection loss
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Figure 31. Host connection lost (vCenter graphs)

Figure 32. CPU readings during hung state

Figure 33. System readings during hung state
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Figure 34a. Network readings during hung state
When the ESXi host machine detected about 2.5 Mbps of traffic through its network interface, the process of
live migration of the VM (DSL) was sent in halted state which we can see from the graphical representation
below, was extended for about 15 minutes. After the artificial traffic was ceased, the VM failed to recognize
the storage adaptor and the tunnel to the destination ESXi host was disconnected. The process of vMotion
failed but VM was unharmed and subsequent vMotion worked correctly. From this output we can assume
that creating workload hotspots does create issues with vMotion. This is an security risk as even though the
extended state of vMotion did not harm the VM in this case, but if there were workloads that were severe
enough to cut the vMotion in half creating a split image, then the VM could be thrown in unstable state and
hence non-recoverable from this crash.

Figure 34b. Network Readings during the state
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Workload distribution for virtual machines
The goal for this test scenario was to research and test an efficient virtual machine based resource
reservation in a clustered environment. This had to be done by making sure that resources are vacated in
time without underutilizing the resources allocated to it. The model that I worked on has been already tested
and my idea for test analysis is solely to test the security implication of the exploits at the time of this
distribution. [17]
Using Distribution Resource Scheduler (DRS), which allows concurrent migrations by allowing cluster
resources to be, divided into smaller resource pools for the VMs. Since the major concept of DRS is to
enable automatic assignment of VMs to hosts managed through vCenter so as to load balance resources, I
was intrigued as how this would react if there was security threat that indicated performance counter
suggesting DRS be activated.

Figure 35. vCenter DRS settings
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So as I went about testing Live VM migration, I tested based on VM memory. First test was done while
migrating single VM (DSL) based on varying memory values ranging from 64 Mb to 512 Mb and for each
value, I was able to observe that there was an exponential increase in the migration delay (in seconds). This
delay can be attributed to the suspension of VM at the source rather than resume phase at the destination.
The memory range was created using a rogue memory injection program which was basically a stress test
tool available as freeware from Google. This stress test tool prolonged the suspend phase at source during
vMotion which is due to extra time needed for synchronization.
Not being too familiar with as how DRS would react in such a scenario, wherein memory injection needing
more resource from the Host, I failed to notice the change. I could not stress test beyond 512 Mb every time
I tried doing that my ESXi host machine would go in non-responsive state with 2 out of 3 VMs alive during
this state. So DRS would not kick in when it was supposed to leading to this failed state.

Figure 36. Single VM – Migration delay

Since DRS failed to act upon the load balancing state, I proceeded to test using migrating sequence of VMs
which were similar in performance. Let me mention this as a reminder that migration is a memory intensive
process and it was necessary to account for performance degradation. When live VMs were migrated in
sequence the migration delays seemed nominal as Host based resource pool had enough time to finish
vacating resources from one VM before working on the next one. In a different case when CPU stressing
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workload was iteratively run so that 100% CPU was consumed, the applications or processes that were
running on VMs take longer to complete.

Figure 37. Two VMs – Migration delay
Finally when I worked on migrating VMs in parallel, I had to compare it with the results as seen in
sequential process. Since all this resource handling is done on the Host machine, the migration time is
obviously going to vary based on the fact whether it is sequential or parallel. Parallel migration results in
resources on the Host being freed up sooner and hence the total migration time is shorter as compared to
sequential process which takes longer overall migration time but shorter time per-VM and lesser impact at
the application level.
I performed the same test for workload disturbance and distribution so as to achieve DRS and this time I
coupled memory variation test with network load stress. At about 2.5 Mbps of bandwidth being utilized for
the network, varying memory load between 64 Mb and 512 Mb, I was able to observe that DRS kicked in,
the VM in transit was forced back to source host in case migration state between 25% and 75%. This was
observed when destination host was bombarded with TCP packets. Above 75%, there was a crash in
migration state and the VM became inactive.
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Figure 38 – Comparison graph – Sequential vs Parallel Migration time

Letting VMs juggle between ESXi hosts depending on resource pool load on the Hosts is what DRS does.
But since we are looking at security implications of this concept, so if DRS is smart enough to relocate VMs
if the resource pool is overworked for one Host and under-worked for other, it most certainly does not
understand that if this VM is overworked may it may CPU or Memory, is that due to natural cause or
artificial reasons like rogue memory stress tool. If the memory stress tool manages to extend the VMs
resources which are acquired from the Host itself, then if DRS kicks in and performs Live migration, then it
pre-medicated by the attacker who is waiting on the network to sniffed out the data transfer due to vMotion
and/or exploit virtual machine files by injecting unsuspecting code like botnet, etc.
As an end of the testing for dynamic allocation, I exploited the live migration using MiTM attack. The
results were similar except that due to increased migration time, the range for DRS being activated was
narrowed down and took place early in the cycle. One of the other instance in which I started the network
packet generation late in the cycle after migration began, DRS failed and VM went in inactive state which
told me that vMotion failed due to extreme network conditions. The destination hypervisor which was
bombarded with TCP packets lost connection with vCenter and VM migration which was at 80% migration
state, could not recover using DRS at this stage.
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Chapter 7
Real-World Analysis
From the beginning of the 21st century, more companies and businesses have started switching over to
virtualization technology but also since the time the modern virtualization system as existed, vulnerabilities
have been around. As per the statistics, 40% of the reported vulnerabilities and threats to the virtualized
environments have high severity because these setups have been fairly easy to exploit and resulting in openended attacks that allow attackers to gain complete control. The result of all the reported vulnerabilities to
virtualized systems over past 10 years indicates a growing trend in attacks to servers as well as workstations.
Most of these attacks have been accounted for in production systems which run on hypervisors while
workstations which are on top of host OS.

Figure 39. Reported Virtualization Vulnerability by Year (2000-2010)
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Unlike non-virtualized systems in which vulnerabilities affect users, hardware and operating system,
vulnerabilities in virtualized systems are more widespread and hence categorized in different classes.

Figure 40. Production Virtualization System Vulnerabilities by Class
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The above results have been derived from research conducted by IBM Corporation. There are newer
evolving virtualization system-specific attacks like VM jumping (using hypervisor escape attacker is able to
jump from one victim VM to other), attacks on VM during deployment which lead to control of those VMs,
rogue code injection into the VMs file structure and Live VM migration attack using MiTM attack class, as
described and experimented for this paper. Lately, there is a new virtualization attack class called as
Hyperjacking which involves deployment of a rogue hypervisor resulting in attacker assuming control of the
Host OS. There are tools that have developed for Hyperjacking but used only in testing purposes.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated how one of the most popular and widely deployed VMM - VMware is
vulnerable to practical attacks targeting their live migration functionality. These threats are cause for
concern and require that appropriate solutions be applied to each class of live migration threats. This paper is
in no way a criticism of virtualization technology especially VMWare. I personally am a follower and user
of VMWare technologies and this paper is research in progress of security around virtual technologies which
should not be taken for granted.

In order to make sure that live migration of virtual machines is secure, there needs to be an authentication
algorithm that protects the communication pane not only between the source and destination VMMs but also
the management servers and agents. The administrator should have access to security policies that controls
effective migration of privileges that are assigned to various players involved during the course of migration.
The so-called tunnel used by migration must be secure and have policies setup so as to detect sniffing and
manipulation of the data or migration state during the migration phase. This can be done by making sure the
vMotion parameter is encrypted correctly which at the moment seems to be in a state of testing or needs
extensive add-ons and monitoring.

One important thing that can be established is setting up of separate virtual switches for vMotion that is kept
aloof from other network objects and tasks. Also vMotion takes place in cleartext by default and VMWare
encryption for vMotion is not full-proof as evident from the tests conducted; administrators need to test
vMotion before the production servers go online. Administrators can also try to incorporate tested
encryption algorithms for vMotion to work securely. A timely audit of these parameters is necessary so as to
reduce chances of breach that can occur during the migration.
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Having mentioned earlier in my report, this research and analysis is no way a criticism or deterrent to use
vMotion in production environment. Over the past decade, VMWare has invested considerably towards their
hypervisor security with introduction of VMSafe and VShield that provides APIs for partnering companies
(mainly security firms) to develop patches for the virtualized system. These patches include monitors for
VM’s memory, virtual disk and/or drivers.
Since I have been able to successfully replicate the exploits as performed by experts and understand the
performance-related results, where do we stand after this and what should be done for future?
Management of virtual infrastructure should be done with a strict code of conduct. Security policies should
be re-visited. There should a close monitor for any changes to the virtualized systems as while it is easy to
execute changes, it is difficult to manage them. Any exploit like stolen guest VM can be used someplace
else and if for instance it a database server, the nothing can stop the thief from stealing data. Furthermore, it
is possible to look into limiting VM intervention by focusing on availability such that the application
running on the VM is not affected due to intervention and data is not compromised. So basically to avoid
integrity and confidentiality loss, we can focus on loss of availability.
As any administrator can understand that any vulnerability to network security could result in breach of data
and intellectual property but when it comes to VM migration that involves full OS, any compromise to the
network can also result in breach of VMM integrity. So to sum it up, the approach towards securing a
virtualized network needs certain add-ons to access control and a methodology that assures complete
isolation from other network objects.
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Appendix - Report
Description
An inventory of VI3 objects with their properties and relations.

Summary
Object

Total

Shared Datastores

1

Datastores
Hosts

2
2

Virtual Machines

5

Operating System
FreeBSD (32-bit)
Other (32-bit)
Ubuntu Linux (32-bit)

Running
0
1
0

Total
1
3
1

1. Datastore to Host

Datastore

Host

Local1

10.0.0.84

Local2
VSAN

10.0.0.85
10.0.0.84; 10.0.0.85

2. Datastore to LUN

Datastore
Local1
Local2

LUN
VMware,:VMware Virtual S:mpx.vmhba1:C0:T0:L0
VMware,:VMware Virtual S:mpx.vmhba1:C0:T0:L0
OPNFILER:VIRTUALDISK:t10.F405E46494C45400371363B66337D235A46676D2
D4748435

VSAN

3. VM to Datastore

VM

Datastore

DSL
FreeBSD

VSAN
VSAN

LLSP
Nostalgia

VSAN
VSAN

Nostalgia2

VSAN
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4. VM to LUN

VM

LUN

DSL

OPNFILER:VIRTUALDISK:t10.F405E46494C45400371363B66337D235A46676D2
D4748435

FreeBSD

OPNFILER:VIRTUALDISK:t10.F405E46494C45400371363B66337D235A46676D2
D4748435

LLSP

OPNFILER:VIRTUALDISK:t10.F405E46494C45400371363B66337D235A46676D2
D4748435

Nostalgia

OPNFILER:VIRTUALDISK:t10.F405E46494C45400371363B66337D235A46676D2
D4748435

Nostalgia2

OPNFILER:VIRTUALDISK:t10.F405E46494C45400371363B66337D235A46676D2
D4748435

5. VM to Host

VM

Host

DSL

10.0.0.84

FreeBSD

10.0.0.84

LLSP

10.0.0.85

Nostalgia

10.0.0.84

Nostalgia2

10.0.0.84

6. iSCSI Adapters

Name

vmhba33

Current Speed (MB)

0

Driver

iscsi_vmk

ISCSI Name

iqn.2006-01.com.openfiler:tsn.e5cba8c98c8c

Key

key-vim.host.InternetScsiHba-vmhba33

Location Path

>10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.84>vmhba33

Max Speed (MB)

0

Model

iSCSI Software Adapter

Name

vmhba33

PCI

UNKNOWN - NULL PCI DEV IN VMKCTL

Status

unknown

Target Address : Target Port 1

10.0.0.88 : 3260

Type

HostInternetScsiHba
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Name

vmhba33

Current Speed (MB)

0

Driver

iscsi_vmk

ISCSI Name

iqn.1998-01.com.vmware:milan-1a41a0cf

Key

key-vim.host.InternetScsiHba-vmhba33

Location Path

>10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.85>vmhba33

Max Speed (MB)

0

Model

iSCSI Software Adapter

Name

vmhba33

PCI

UNKNOWN - NULL PCI DEV IN VMKCTL

Status

unknown

Target Address : Target Port 1

10.0.0.88 : 3260

Type

HostInternetScsiHba

7. SCSI Adapters

Name

vmhba1

Bus

0

Driver

mptspi

Key

key-vim.host.ParallelScsiHba-vmhba1

Location Path

>10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.84>vmhba1

Model

53c1030 PCI-X Fusion-MPT Dual Ultra320 SCSI

Name

vmhba1

PCI

00:10.0

Status

unknown

Type

HostParallelScsiHba

Name

vmhba1

Bus

0

Driver

mptspi

Key

key-vim.host.ParallelScsiHba-vmhba1

Location Path
Model

>10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.85>vmhba1
53c1030 PCI-X Fusion-MPT Dual Ultra320 SCSI

Name

vmhba1

PCI

00:10.0

Status

unknown

Type

HostParallelScsiHba

8. LUNs
58

Block

Name

VMware,:VMware Virtual S:mpx.vmhba1:C0:T0:L0
419430400

Block Size

512

Capacity

200 GB

Device Name

/vmfs/devices/disks/mpx.vmhba1:C0:T0:L0

Device Type

disk

Host

10.0.0.84

Key

key-vim.host.ScsiDisk-0000000000766d686261313a303a30

Location Path

>10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.84>mpx.vmhba1:C0:T0:L0

LUN Type

disk

Model

VMware Virtual S

Name

VMware,:VMware Virtual S:mpx.vmhba1:C0:T0:L0

Revision

1.0

SCSI Level

2

SCSI Level Specified

True

Serial Number

unavailable

Type
Uuid

VimApi.HostScsiDisk
0000000000766d686261313a303a30

Vendor

VMware,

Block

OPNFILER:VIRTUALDISK:t10.F405E46494C45400371363B66337D235A46676D2
D4748435
410779648

Block Size

512

Capacity

195.875 GB

Device Name

/vmfs/devices/disks/t10.F405E46494C45400371363B66337D2
35A46676D2D4748435

Device Type

disk

Host

10.0.0.84

Key

key-vim.host.ScsiDisk01000000007331366b36732d534a66672d4d474853564952545
541

Location Path

>10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.84>t10.F405E46494C45400
371363B66337D235A46676D2D4748435

LUN Type

disk

Model

VIRTUAL-DISK

Name

OPNFILER:VIRTUALDISK:t10.F405E46494C45400371363B66337D235A46676D2
D4748435

Revision

0

SCSI Level

4

SCSI Level Specified

True

Name
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Serial Number

unavailable

Type

VimApi.HostScsiDisk

Uuid

01000000007331366b36732d534a66672d4d474853564952545
541

Vendor

OPNFILER

Block

Name

VMware,:VMware Virtual S:mpx.vmhba1:C0:T0:L0
419430400

Block Size

512

Capacity

200 GB

Device Name

/vmfs/devices/disks/mpx.vmhba1:C0:T0:L0

Device Type

disk

Host

10.0.0.85

Key

key-vim.host.ScsiDisk-0000000000766d686261313a303a30

Location Path

>10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.85>mpx.vmhba1:C0:T0:L0

LUN Type

disk

Model

VMware Virtual S

Name

VMware,:VMware Virtual S:mpx.vmhba1:C0:T0:L0

Revision

1.0

SCSI Level

2

SCSI Level Specified

True

Serial Number

unavailable

Type

VimApi.HostScsiDisk

Uuid

0000000000766d686261313a303a30

Vendor

VMware,

Block

OPNFILER:VIRTUALDISK:t10.F405E46494C45400371363B66337D235A46676D2
D4748435
410779648

Block Size

512

Capacity

195.875 GB

Device Name

/vmfs/devices/disks/t10.F405E46494C45400371363B66337D2
35A46676D2D4748435

Device Type

disk

Host

10.0.0.85

Key

key-vim.host.ScsiDisk01000000007331366b36732d534a66672d4d474853564952545
541

Location Path

>10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.85>t10.F405E46494C45400
371363B66337D235A46676D2D4748435

LUN Type

disk

Model

VIRTUAL-DISK

Name

OPNFILER:VIRTUALDISK:t10.F405E46494C45400371363B66337D235A46676D2

Name
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D4748435
Revision

0

SCSI Level

4

SCSI Level Specified

True

Serial Number

unavailable

Type

VimApi.HostScsiDisk

Uuid

01000000007331366b36732d534a66672d4d474853564952545
541

Vendor

OPNFILER

9. Shared Datastores

Name

VSAN

Accessible

True

Capacity

195.75 GB

Capacity (GB) numeric

195.75

Free Space

163.054 GB

Free Space (GB) numeric

163.054

FS block size

1 MB

FS type

VMFS

Location Path

>10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.84>VSAN

Managed Object Reference

datastore-213

Multiple Host Access

true

Name

VSAN

Summary

sanfs://vmfs_uuid:4d021938-1cb133cb-32a8-000c29542e7f/

Type

Datastore

VMCount

5

10. Datastores

Name

Local1

Accessible

True

Capacity

195 GB

Capacity (GB) numeric

195

Free Space

194.451 GB

Free Space (GB) numeric

194.451

FS block size

1 MB

FS type

VMFS

Location Path

>10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.84>Local1

Managed Object Reference

datastore-208

Multiple Host Access

false

Name

Local1
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Summary

sanfs://vmfs_uuid:4d00dc67-399ae1b8-fb9d-000c29542e7f/

Type

Datastore

Name

Local2

Accessible

True

Capacity

195 GB

Capacity (GB) numeric

195

Free Space

194.451 GB

Free Space (GB) numeric

194.451

FS block size

1 MB

FS type

VMFS

Location Path

>10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.85>Local2

Managed Object Reference

datastore-220

Multiple Host Access

false

Name

Local2

Summary

sanfs://vmfs_uuid:4d00d7f6-3c89bcfc-8617-000c294735d3/

Type

Datastore

11. Clusters

Name

Melvin

Current balance

-1000

Current failover level

-1

DRS

disabled

Effective cpu (in MHz)

2712

Effective memory (in MB)

1306

HA

disabled

Location Path

>10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin

Managed Object Reference

domain-c141

Name

Melvin

Number of cpu cores

2

Number of cpu threads

2

Number of effective hosts

2

Number of hosts

2

Parent

Thesis

Status

green

Target DRS balance

-1000

Total cpu (in MHz)

4940

Total memory (in bytes)

5361614848

Type

ClusterComputeResource

Vmotions number

41
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12. Hosts
Name

10.0.0.84

Cluster

Melvin

Connection State

connected

Cpu core frequency (in MHz)

2537

CPU overall usage

1224

CPU Sockets

1

Datacenter

Thesis

Hyperthreading

False

License expiration date

3/10/2011 2:08:27 AM

License feature 1 Name

vmotion

License feature 2 Name

esxHost

License used units

1

Location Path

>10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.84

Managed Object Reference

host-205

Manufacturer

VMware, Inc.

Memory overall usage
Memory Size

820
2.497 GB

Memory Size, GB

2.497

Model

VMware Virtual Platform

Name

10.0.0.84

Parent

Melvin

Power State

poweredOn

Processor cores

1

Processor type

Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Duo CPU

Processors

1

Product

VMware ESXi 4.0.0 build-171294

Runtime Info boot time

1/20/2011 2:16:20 AM

Type

HostSystem
Name

P8700 @ 2.53GHz

10.0.0.85

Cluster

Melvin

Connection State

connected

Cpu core frequency (in MHz)

2403

CPU overall usage

141

CPU Sockets

1

Datacenter

Thesis

Hyperthreading

False

License expiration date

2/26/2011 6:40:59 PM

License feature 1 Name

vmotion

License feature 2 Name

esxHost

License used units

1

Location Path

>10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.85
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Managed Object Reference

host-217

Manufacturer

VMware, Inc.

Memory overall usage

744

Memory Size

2.497 GB

Memory Size, GB

2.497

Model

VMware Virtual Platform

Name

10.0.0.85

Parent

Melvin

Power State

poweredOn

Processor cores

1

Processor type

Intel(R) Core(TM) i3 CPU

Processors

1

Product

VMware ESXi 4.0.0 build-171294

Runtime Info boot time

1/19/2011 2:11:33 PM

Type

HostSystem

M 370 @ 2.40GHz

13. Resource Pools

Name

Resources

ConfiguredMemoryMB

1207959552

Cpu expandable

True

Cpu level

normal

Cpu limit

2712

Cpu reservation

2712

Cpu shares

4000

LastModified

Not set

Location Path

>10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>Resources

Managed Object Reference

resgroup-143

Memory expandable

True

Memory level

normal

Memory limit

1318

Memory reservation

1318

Memory shares

163840

Name

Resources

OverallStatus

green

Parent

Melvin

SummaryName

Not set

Type

ResourcePool

14. Virtual Switches

Name

vSwitch0

64

Active Adapters

vmnic0

Forget Transmits

True

Host

10.0.0.84

Link discovery protocol

cdp

Link discovery protocol operation

listen

Load Balancing

Route based on the source of the port ID

Location Path

>10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.84>vSwitch0

MAC Address Changes

True

Name

vSwitch0

Network Failure Detection

False

Notify Switches

True

Number of ports

56

Promiscuous Mode

False

Type

HostVirtualSwitch

Name

vSwitch0

Active Adapters

vmnic0

Forget Transmits

True

Host

10.0.0.85

Link discovery protocol

cdp

Link discovery protocol operation

listen

Load Balancing

Route based on the source of the port ID

Location Path

>10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.85>vSwitch0

MAC Address Changes

True

Name

vSwitch0

Network Failure Detection

False

Notify Switches

True

Number of ports

56

Promiscuous Mode

False

Type

HostVirtualSwitch

15. Physical Adapters

Name

vmnic0

Connection State

Connected

DHCP

False

Driver

e1000

Duplex

full

Host

10.0.0.84

IP Hints

;vlan: 0, subnet: 10.0.0.8-10.0.0.15

Location Path

>10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.84>vmnic0

Name

vmnic0
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SpeedMb

1000

Type

PhysicalNic

Name

vmnic0

Connection State

Connected

DHCP

False

Driver

e1000

Duplex

full

Host

10.0.0.85

IP Hints

;vlan: 0, subnet: 10.0.0.8-10.0.0.15

Location Path

>10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.85>vmnic0

Name

vmnic0

SpeedMb

1000

Type

PhysicalNic

16. VM Kernels

Name

vmk0

Host

10.0.0.84

IP Address

10.0.0.84

Location Path

>10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.84>vmk0

MAC Address

00:0c:29:54:2e:7f

Name

vmk0

Subnet Mask

255.255.255.0

Type

HostVirtualNic

Name

vmk1

Host

10.0.0.84

IP Address

10.0.0.86

Location Path

>10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.84>vmk1

MAC Address

00:50:56:75:c2:2d

Name

vmk1

Subnet Mask

255.255.255.0

Type

HostVirtualNic

Name

vmk0

Host

10.0.0.85

IP Address

10.0.0.85
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Location Path

>10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.85>vmk0

MAC Address

00:0c:29:47:35:d3

Name

vmk0

Subnet Mask

255.255.255.0

Type

HostVirtualNic

Name

vmk1

Host

10.0.0.85

IP Address

10.0.0.87

Location Path

>10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.85>vmk1

MAC Address

00:50:56:7f:cd:88

Name

vmk1

Subnet Mask

255.255.255.0

Type

HostVirtualNic

17. Networks

Name

VM Network

Host

10.0.0.84

Location Path

>10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.84>VM Network

Managed Object Reference

network-124

Name

VM Network

Type

HostPortGroup

VLANID

0

Name

VMkernel

Host

10.0.0.84

Location Path

>10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.84>VMkernel

Name

VMkernel

Type

HostPortGroup

VLANID

0

Name

Management Network

Active Adapters

vmnic0

Host

10.0.0.84

Load Balancing

Route based on the source of the port ID

Location Path

>10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.84>Management Network

Name

Management Network

Network Failure Detection

False

67

Notify Switches

True

Type

HostPortGroup

VLANID

0

Name

VM Network

Host

10.0.0.85

Location Path

>10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.85>VM Network

Managed Object Reference

network-124

Name

VM Network

Type

HostPortGroup

VLANID

0

Name

VMkernel

Host

10.0.0.85

Location Path

>10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.85>VMkernel

Name

VMkernel

Type

HostPortGroup

VLANID

0

Name

Management Network

Active Adapters

vmnic0

Host

10.0.0.85

Load Balancing

Route based on the source of the port ID

Location Path

>10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.85>Management Network

Name

Management Network

Network Failure Detection

False

Notify Switches

True

Type

HostPortGroup

VLANID

0

18. Virtual Machines

Name

FreeBSD

Alternate guest name

FreeBSD (32-bit)

Annotation

Not set

Boot delay

0

Capability cpu feature mask supported

True

Capability is boot options supported

True

Capability is disabling snapshots supported

False

Capability is disk shares supported

True

68

Capability is lock snapshots supported

False

Capability is memory snapshots supported

True

Capability is multiple snapshots supported

True

Capability is npiv wwn on non rdm vm supported

True

Capability is powered off snapshots supported

True

Capability is quiesced snapshots supported

True

Capability is record replay supported

True

Capability is revert to snapshot supported

True

Capability is s1Acpi management supported

True

Capability is setting display topology supported

False

Capability is setting screen resolution supported

False

Capability is setting video ram size supported

True

Capability is snapshot config supported

True

Capability is snapshot operations supported

True

Capability is swap placement supported

True

Capability is tools auto update supported

False

Capability is tools sync time supported

True

Capability is virtual mmu usage supported

True

Capability is vm npiv wwn disable supported

True

Capability is vm npiv wwn supported
Capability is vm npiv wwn update supported

True
True

CD/DVD drive 1 label

CD/DVD Drive 1

CD/DVD drive 1 summary

ISO [VSAN] ISOs/FreeBSD-7.3-RELEASE-i386-livefs.iso

CDROM Mounted

False

Change Tracking Enabled

False

ChangeVersion

1/19/2011 8:53:29 PM

Cluster

Melvin

Committed 1

8590277234

Connection State

connected

CPU

1

Cpu expandable

False

Cpu level

normal

Cpu limit

Not set

Cpu reservation

Not set

Cpu shares

1000

Default power off operation type

soft

Default reset type

soft

Default suspend type

hard

Disable acceleration

False

Disk uuid enabled

False

Enable logging

True

Guest id

Not set

Guest OS

FreeBSD (32-bit)

Hardware virtualization for execution usage

hvAuto

Has snapshot(s)

No
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Host

10.0.0.84

Hostname

Not set

Hot plug memory increment size

0

Hot plug memory limit

0

Ht sharing

any

Instance UUID

526ffa43-7f9f-1027-735a-96b61e99b490

Ip address

Not set

Is cpu hot add enabled

False

Is cpu hot remove enabled

False

Is question raised

Not set

Last modified

1/1/1970 12:00:00 AM

List of datastore name and urls

name: VSAN, url: /vmfs/volumes/4d021938-1cb133cb-32a8000c29542e7f

Location

564d73ca-ce99-3472-b49d-da4ee80d5904

Location Path

>10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.84>FreeBSD

Log directory

[VSAN] FreeBSD/

Managed Object Reference

vm-277

Memory (MB)

256

Memory expandable

False

Memory hot add enabled

False

Memory level

normal

Memory limit

Not set

Memory reservation

Not set

Memory shares

2560

Monitor type

release

Name

FreeBSD

Network Adapter 1 Label

Network adapter 1

Network Adapter 1 MAC

00:50:56:ad:56:71

Network Adapter 1 Summary

VM Network

Notes

Not set

NPIV desired node WWNs

0

NPIV desired port Wwns

0

NPIV is temporary disabled

True

NPIV node World Wide Name

Not set

NPIV on non rdm disks

False

NPIV port world wide name

Not set

NPIV world wide name type

Not set

Number of cpu

1

Number of ethernet cards

1

Number of virtual disks

1

OverallStatus

green

Parent

Not set

Power off operation type

preset

Power State

poweredOff

Record replay enabled

False
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Record replay state

inactive

Reset type

preset

Run with debug info

False

Runtime Info boot time

Not set

Runtime Info clean power off

False

Runtime Info fault tolerance state

notConfigured

Runtime info max cpu usage

1393

Runtime info max memory usage

256

Runtime Info memory overhead

114311168

Runtime Info need secondary reason

Not set

Runtime Info number of active MKS connections

0

SCSI bus sharing 1

noSharing

SCSI controller 1

LSI Logic

SCSI controller name 1

SCSI controller 0

Snapshot directory

[VSAN] FreeBSD/

Snapshot power off behavior

powerOff

Snapshot tree locked

False

Snapshots disabled

False

Standby action

powerOnSuspend

Suspend directory
Suspend interval

[VSAN] FreeBSD/
0

Suspend operation type

preset

Suspend time

Not set

Swap placement

inherit

Template

False

Tools installer mounted

False

Tools status

guestToolsNotRunning

Tools version status

guestToolsNotInstalled

Type

VirtualMachine

Uncommitted 1

268435456

Unshared 1

8590277234

Use TCP/IP Offloading

False

UUID

422d9e50-0500-44f6-8202-99643638e2bb

Version

vmx-07

Virtual Disk 1 Disk Mode

persistent

Virtual Disk 1 Is split

No

Virtual Disk 1 Is thin provisioned

No

Virtual Disk 1 Is write through

No

Virtual Disk 1 Label

Hard disk 1

Virtual Disk 1 Summary

8388608 KB

Virtual Disk 1 Summary, GB

8

Virtual MMU usage

automatic

Vm config file

[VSAN] FreeBSD/FreeBSD.vmx

VMCapability is change tracking supported

True

VMCapability is console preferences supported

False
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Vmdk File 1

[VSAN] FreeBSD/FreeBSD.vmdk

VMTools after power on

True

VMTools after resume

True

VMTools before guest reboot

False

VMTools before guest shutdown

True

VMTools before guest standby

True

VMTools pending customization

Not set

VMTools sync time with host

False

VMTools tools version

0

VMtools upgrade policy

manual

VMWare Tools

tools not installed

Vmx File

[VSAN] FreeBSD/FreeBSD.vmx

Vmx File Short

FreeBSD.vmx

Will enter BIOS setup during next boot

False

Name
Alternate guest name
Annotation

Nostalgia2
Not set
Nostalgia contains a great collection of ancient DOS Games,
ready to play!
Now you can begin to waste your time once again.

Boot delay

0

Capability cpu feature mask supported

True

Capability is boot options supported

True

Capability is disabling snapshots supported

False

Capability is disk shares supported

True

Capability is lock snapshots supported

False

Capability is memory snapshots supported

True

Capability is multiple snapshots supported

True

Capability is npiv wwn on non rdm vm supported

False

Capability is powered off snapshots supported

True

Capability is quiesced snapshots supported

True

Capability is record replay supported

True

Capability is revert to snapshot supported

True

Capability is s1Acpi management supported

True

Capability is setting display topology supported

False

Capability is setting screen resolution supported

False

Capability is setting video ram size supported
Capability is snapshot config supported

True
True

Capability is snapshot operations supported

True

Capability is swap placement supported

True

Capability is tools auto update supported

False

Capability is tools sync time supported

True

Capability is virtual mmu usage supported

True
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Capability is vm npiv wwn disable supported

False

Capability is vm npiv wwn supported

True

Capability is vm npiv wwn update supported

False

CD/DVD drive 1 label

CD/DVD Drive 1

CD/DVD drive 1 summary

ATAPI CDROM 0

CDROM Mounted

False

Change Tracking Enabled

False

ChangeVersion

1/19/2011 8:53:40 PM

Cluster

Melvin

Committed 1

107656118

Connection State

connected

CPU

1

Cpu expandable

False

Cpu level

normal

Cpu limit

Not set

Cpu reservation

Not set

Cpu shares

1000

Default power off operation type

soft

Default reset type

soft

Default suspend type
Disable acceleration

hard
False

Disk uuid enabled

False

Enable logging

True

Guest id

Not set

Guest OS

Other (32-bit)

Hardware virtualization for execution usage

hvAuto

Has snapshot(s)

No

Host

10.0.0.84

Hostname

Not set

Hot plug memory increment size

0

Hot plug memory limit

0

Ht sharing

any

Instance UUID

502d6bb1-0bfe-ceff-3531-d5432fcfb2a6

Ip address

Not set

Is cpu hot add enabled

False

Is cpu hot remove enabled

False

Is question raised

Not set

Last modified

1/1/1970 12:00:00 AM

List of datastore name and urls

name: VSAN, url: /vmfs/volumes/4d021938-1cb133cb-32a8000c29542e7f

Location

564d69bb-f70f-2652-da91-30f661e6efca

Location Path

>10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.84>Nostalgia2

Log directory

[VSAN] Nostalgia2/

Managed Object Reference

vm-294

Memory (MB)

64

73

Memory expandable

False

Memory hot add enabled

False

Memory level

normal

Memory limit

Not set

Memory reservation

Not set

Memory shares

640

Monitor type

release

Name

Nostalgia2

Network Adapter 1 Label

Network adapter 1

Network Adapter 1 MAC

00:50:56:ad:76:c8

Network Adapter 1 Summary

VM Network

Notes

Nostalgia contains a great collection of ancient DOS Games,
ready to play!
Now you can begin to waste your time once again.

NPIV desired node WWNs

0

NPIV desired port Wwns

0

NPIV is temporary disabled

False

NPIV node World Wide Name

Not set

NPIV on non rdm disks

False

NPIV port world wide name

Not set

NPIV world wide name type

Not set

Number of cpu

1

Number of ethernet cards

1

Number of virtual disks

1

OverallStatus

green

Parent

Not set

Power off operation type

soft

Power State

poweredOff

Record replay enabled

False

Record replay state

inactive

Reset type

soft

Run with debug info

False

Runtime Info boot time

Not set

Runtime Info clean power off

False

Runtime Info fault tolerance state

notConfigured

Runtime info max cpu usage

1393

Runtime info max memory usage

64

Runtime Info memory overhead

111149056

Runtime Info need secondary reason

Not set

Runtime Info number of active MKS connections

0

SCSI bus sharing 1

noSharing

SCSI controller 1

BusLogic

SCSI controller name 1

SCSI controller 0

Snapshot directory

[VSAN] Nostalgia2/
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Snapshot power off behavior

powerOff

Snapshot tree locked

False

Snapshots disabled

False

Standby action

checkpoint

Suspend directory

[VSAN] Nostalgia2/

Suspend interval

0

Suspend operation type

hard

Suspend time

Not set

Swap placement

inherit

Template

False

Tools installer mounted

False

Tools status

guestToolsNotRunning

Tools version status

guestToolsNotInstalled

Type

VirtualMachine

Uncommitted 1

67108864

Unshared 1

107656118

Use TCP/IP Offloading

False

UUID

564d69bb-f70f-2652-da91-30f661e6efca

Version

vmx-04

Virtual Disk 1 Disk Mode
Virtual Disk 1 Is split

persistent
No

Virtual Disk 1 Is thin provisioned

No

Virtual Disk 1 Is write through

No

Virtual Disk 1 Label

Hard disk 1

Virtual Disk 1 Summary

104858 KB

Virtual Disk 1 Summary, GB

0.1

Virtual MMU usage

automatic

Vm config file

[VSAN] Nostalgia2/Nostalgia.vmx

VMCapability is change tracking supported

False

VMCapability is console preferences supported

False

Vmdk File 1

[VSAN] Nostalgia2/Nostalgia.vmdk

VMTools after power on

True

VMTools after resume

True

VMTools before guest reboot

False

VMTools before guest shutdown

True

VMTools before guest standby

True

VMTools pending customization

Not set

VMTools sync time with host

False

VMTools tools version

0

VMtools upgrade policy

manual

VMWare Tools

tools not installed

Vmx File

[VSAN] Nostalgia2/Nostalgia.vmx

Vmx File Short

Nostalgia.vmx

Will enter BIOS setup during next boot

False
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Name
Alternate guest name
Annotation

Nostalgia
Not set
Nostalgia contains a great collection of ancient DOS Games,
ready to play!
Now you can begin to waste your time once again.

Boot delay

0

Capability cpu feature mask supported

True

Capability is boot options supported

True

Capability is disabling snapshots supported

False

Capability is disk shares supported

True

Capability is lock snapshots supported

False

Capability is memory snapshots supported

True

Capability is multiple snapshots supported

True

Capability is npiv wwn on non rdm vm supported

False

Capability is powered off snapshots supported

True

Capability is quiesced snapshots supported

True

Capability is record replay supported

True

Capability is revert to snapshot supported

True

Capability is s1Acpi management supported

True

Capability is setting display topology supported

False

Capability is setting screen resolution supported

False

Capability is setting video ram size supported

True

Capability is snapshot config supported

True

Capability is snapshot operations supported

True

Capability is swap placement supported

True

Capability is tools auto update supported

False

Capability is tools sync time supported

True

Capability is virtual mmu usage supported

True

Capability is vm npiv wwn disable supported

False

Capability is vm npiv wwn supported

True

Capability is vm npiv wwn update supported

False

CD/DVD drive 1 label

CD/DVD Drive 1

CD/DVD drive 1 summary

ATAPI CDROM 0

CDROM Mounted

False

Change Tracking Enabled

False

ChangeVersion

1/19/2011 10:14:20 PM

Cluster

Melvin

Committed 1

107618581

Connection State

connected

CPU

1

Cpu expandable

False

Cpu level

normal

Cpu limit

Not set

Cpu reservation

Not set
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Cpu shares

1000

Default power off operation type

soft

Default reset type

soft

Default suspend type

hard

Disable acceleration

False

Disk uuid enabled

False

Enable logging

True

Guest id

Not set

Guest OS

Other (32-bit)

Hardware virtualization for execution usage

hvAuto

Has snapshot(s)

No

Host

10.0.0.84

Hostname

Not set

Hot plug memory increment size

0

Hot plug memory limit

0

Ht sharing

any

Instance UUID

526ed5f0-0059-c0ac-0de0-5695547d63b6

Ip address

Not set

Is cpu hot add enabled

False

Is cpu hot remove enabled
Is question raised

False
Not set

Last modified

1/1/1970 12:00:00 AM

List of datastore name and urls

name: VSAN, url: /vmfs/volumes/4d021938-1cb133cb-32a8000c29542e7f

Location

564dc808-69cc-a534-400a-ed9edd1d93d0

Location Path

>10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.84>Nostalgia

Log directory

[VSAN] Nostalgia/

Managed Object Reference

vm-303

Memory (MB)

64

Memory expandable

False

Memory hot add enabled

False

Memory level

normal

Memory limit

Not set

Memory reservation

Not set

Memory shares

640

Monitor type

release

Name

Nostalgia

Network Adapter 1 Label

Network adapter 1

Network Adapter 1 MAC

00:50:56:ad:10:3c

Network Adapter 1 Summary

VM Network

Notes

Nostalgia contains a great collection of ancient DOS Games,
ready to play!
Now you can begin to waste your time once again.

NPIV desired node WWNs

0

NPIV desired port Wwns

0
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NPIV is temporary disabled

False

NPIV node World Wide Name

Not set

NPIV on non rdm disks

False

NPIV port world wide name

Not set

NPIV world wide name type

Not set

Number of cpu

1

Number of ethernet cards

1

Number of virtual disks

1

OverallStatus

green

Parent

Not set

Power off operation type

soft

Power State

poweredOff

Record replay enabled

False

Record replay state

inactive

Reset type

soft

Run with debug info

False

Runtime Info boot time

Not set

Runtime Info clean power off

False

Runtime Info fault tolerance state

notConfigured

Runtime info max cpu usage
Runtime info max memory usage

1319
64

Runtime Info memory overhead

111149056

Runtime Info need secondary reason

Not set

Runtime Info number of active MKS connections

0

SCSI bus sharing 1

noSharing

SCSI controller 1

BusLogic

SCSI controller name 1

SCSI controller 0

Snapshot directory

[VSAN] Nostalgia/

Snapshot power off behavior

powerOff

Snapshot tree locked

False

Snapshots disabled

False

Standby action

checkpoint

Suspend directory

[VSAN] Nostalgia/

Suspend interval

0

Suspend operation type

hard

Suspend time

Not set

Swap placement

inherit

Template

False

Tools installer mounted

False

Tools status

guestToolsNotRunning

Tools version status

guestToolsNotInstalled

Type

VirtualMachine

Uncommitted 1

67108864

Unshared 1

107618581

Use TCP/IP Offloading

False
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UUID

564d7779-6174-6a0c-e594-9c84443f9d51

Version

vmx-04

Virtual Disk 1 Disk Mode

persistent

Virtual Disk 1 Is split

No

Virtual Disk 1 Is thin provisioned

No

Virtual Disk 1 Is write through

No

Virtual Disk 1 Label

Hard disk 1

Virtual Disk 1 Summary

104858 KB

Virtual Disk 1 Summary, GB

0.1

Virtual MMU usage

automatic

Vm config file

[VSAN] Nostalgia/Nostalgia.vmx

VMCapability is change tracking supported

False

VMCapability is console preferences supported

False

Vmdk File 1

[VSAN] Nostalgia/Nostalgia.vmdk

VMTools after power on

True

VMTools after resume

True

VMTools before guest reboot

False

VMTools before guest shutdown

True

VMTools before guest standby

True

VMTools pending customization
VMTools sync time with host

Not set
False

VMTools tools version

0

VMtools upgrade policy

manual

VMWare Tools

tools not installed

Vmx File

[VSAN] Nostalgia/Nostalgia.vmx

Vmx File Short

Nostalgia.vmx

Will enter BIOS setup during next boot

False

Name

LLSP

Alternate guest name

Not set

Annotation

Not set

Boot delay

0

Capability cpu feature mask supported

True

Capability is boot options supported

True

Capability is disabling snapshots supported

False

Capability is disk shares supported

True

Capability is lock snapshots supported

False

Capability is memory snapshots supported

True

Capability is multiple snapshots supported

True

Capability is npiv wwn on non rdm vm supported

True

Capability is powered off snapshots supported

True

Capability is quiesced snapshots supported

True

Capability is record replay supported

True
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Capability is revert to snapshot supported

True

Capability is s1Acpi management supported

True

Capability is setting display topology supported

False

Capability is setting screen resolution supported

False

Capability is setting video ram size supported

True

Capability is snapshot config supported

True

Capability is snapshot operations supported

True

Capability is swap placement supported

True

Capability is tools auto update supported

False

Capability is tools sync time supported

True

Capability is virtual mmu usage supported

True

Capability is vm npiv wwn disable supported

True

Capability is vm npiv wwn supported

True

Capability is vm npiv wwn update supported

True

CD/DVD drive 1 label

CD/DVD Drive 1

CD/DVD drive 1 summary

ATAPI ide0:0

CDROM Mounted

False

Change Tracking Enabled

False

ChangeVersion

1/19/2011 8:42:43 AM

Cluster
Committed 1

Melvin
1073801554

Connection State

connected

CPU

1

Cpu expandable

False

Cpu level

normal

Cpu limit

Not set

Cpu reservation

Not set

Cpu shares

1000

Default power off operation type

soft

Default reset type

soft

Default suspend type

hard

Disable acceleration

False

Disk uuid enabled

False

Enable logging

True

Eula

Not set

Guest id

other26xLinuxGuest

Guest OS

Ubuntu Linux (32-bit)

Hardware virtualization for execution usage

hvAuto

Has snapshot(s)

No

Host

10.0.0.85

Hostname

ubuntu.local

Hot plug memory increment size

0

Hot plug memory limit

0

Ht sharing

any

InstallBootStopDelay

0
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Instance UUID

52eb61eb-9f96-4dcd-6c32-348d33aa2a84

Ip address

10.0.0.22

IpAllocationPolicy

fixedPolicy

IpProtocol

IPv4

Is cpu hot add enabled

False

Is cpu hot remove enabled

False

Is question raised

Not set

Last modified

1/1/1970 12:00:00 AM

List of datastore name and urls

name: VSAN, url: /vmfs/volumes/4d021938-1cb133cb-32a8000c29542e7f

Location

564d8a44-8d32-f1f5-2209-e4eb5c3ddfdf

Location Path

>10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.85>LLSP

Log directory

[VSAN] LLSP/

Managed Object Reference

vm-404

Memory (MB)

512

Memory expandable

False

Memory hot add enabled

False

Memory level

normal

Memory limit

Not set

Memory reservation

Not set

Memory shares

5120

Monitor type

release

Name

LLSP

Network Adapter 1 IP

10.0.0.22

Network Adapter 1 Label

Network adapter 1

Network Adapter 1 MAC

00:50:56:ad:01:6c

Network Adapter 1 Summary

VM Network

Notes

Not set

NPIV desired node WWNs

0

NPIV desired port Wwns

0

NPIV is temporary disabled

True

NPIV node World Wide Name

Not set

NPIV on non rdm disks

False

NPIV port world wide name

Not set

NPIV world wide name type

Not set

Number of cpu

1

Number of ethernet cards

1

Number of virtual disks

1

OverallStatus

green

OvfEnvironmentTransport

Not set

Parent

Not set

Power off operation type

soft

Power State

poweredOff

Record replay enabled

False

Record replay state

inactive
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Reset type

soft

Run with debug info

False

Runtime Info boot time

Not set

Runtime Info clean power off

False

Runtime Info fault tolerance state

notConfigured

Runtime info max cpu usage

1319

Runtime info max memory usage

512

Runtime Info memory overhead

118517760

Runtime Info need secondary reason

Not set

Runtime Info number of active MKS connections

0

SCSI bus sharing 1

noSharing

SCSI controller 1

LSI Logic

SCSI controller name 1

SCSI controller 0

Snapshot directory

[VSAN] LLSP/

Snapshot power off behavior

powerOff

Snapshot tree locked

False

Snapshots disabled

False

Standby action

checkpoint

SupportedAllocationScheme

Not set

SupportedIpProtocol
Suspend directory

IPv4
[VSAN] LLSP/

Suspend interval

0

Suspend operation type

hard

Suspend time

Not set

Swap placement

inherit

Template

False

Tools installer mounted

False

Tools status

guestToolsNotRunning

Tools version status

guestToolsCurrent

Type

VirtualMachine

Uncommitted 1

536870912

Unshared 1

1073801554

Use TCP/IP Offloading

False

UUID

422d2e0c-2fd5-ad39-1836-e18ce991bcc2

Version

vmx-07

Virtual Disk 1 Disk Mode

persistent

Virtual Disk 1 Is split

No

Virtual Disk 1 Is thin provisioned

No

Virtual Disk 1 Is write through

No

Virtual Disk 1 Label

Hard disk 1

Virtual Disk 1 Summary

1048576 KB

Virtual Disk 1 Summary, GB

1

Virtual MMU usage

automatic

Vm config file

[VSAN] LLSP/LLSP.vmx

VMCapability is change tracking supported

True
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VMCapability is console preferences supported

False

Vmdk File 1

[VSAN] LLSP/LLSP.vmdk

VMTools after power on

True

VMTools after resume

True

VMTools before guest reboot

False

VMTools before guest shutdown

True

VMTools before guest standby

True

VMTools pending customization

Not set

VMTools sync time with host

False

VMTools tools version

8322

VMtools upgrade policy

manual

VMWare Tools

not running

Vmx File

[VSAN] LLSP/LLSP.vmx

Vmx File Short

LLSP.vmx

Will enter BIOS setup during next boot

False

Name

DSL

Alternate guest name

Other (32-bit)

Annotation

Not set

Boot delay

0

Capability cpu feature mask supported

True

Capability is boot options supported

True

Capability is disabling snapshots supported

False

Capability is disk shares supported

True

Capability is lock snapshots supported

False

Capability is memory snapshots supported

True

Capability is multiple snapshots supported

True

Capability is npiv wwn on non rdm vm supported

True

Capability is powered off snapshots supported

True

Capability is quiesced snapshots supported

True

Capability is record replay supported

True

Capability is revert to snapshot supported

True

Capability is s1Acpi management supported

True

Capability is setting display topology supported

False

Capability is setting screen resolution supported

False

Capability is setting video ram size supported

True

Capability is snapshot config supported

True

Capability is snapshot operations supported

True

Capability is swap placement supported

True

Capability is tools auto update supported

False

Capability is tools sync time supported

True

Capability is virtual mmu usage supported

True

Capability is vm npiv wwn disable supported

True
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Capability is vm npiv wwn supported

True

Capability is vm npiv wwn update supported

True

CD/DVD drive 1 label

CD/DVD Drive 1

CD/DVD drive 1 summary

ISO [VSAN] ISOs/dsl-4.4.10.iso

CDROM Mounted

True

Change Tracking Enabled

False

ChangeVersion

1/20/2011 10:08:15 AM

Cluster

Melvin

Committed 1

16374876340

Connection State

connected

CPU

1

Cpu expandable

False

Cpu level

normal

Cpu limit

Not set

Cpu reservation

Not set

Cpu shares

1000

Default power off operation type

soft

Default reset type

soft

Default suspend type

hard

Disable acceleration
Disk uuid enabled

False
False

Enable logging

True

Guest id

Not set

Guest OS

Other (32-bit)

Hardware virtualization for execution usage

hvAuto

Has snapshot(s)

No

Host

10.0.0.84

Hostname

Not set

Hot plug memory increment size

0

Hot plug memory limit

256

Ht sharing

any

Instance UUID

528a2ef3-5113-c216-74c3-98a86e65cf3b

Ip address

Not set

Is cpu hot add enabled

False

Is cpu hot remove enabled

False

Is question raised

Not set

Last modified

1/1/1970 12:00:00 AM

List of datastore name and urls

name: VSAN, url: /vmfs/volumes/4d021938-1cb133cb-32a8000c29542e7f

Location

564d2765-23c1-35cb-0889-f9a6f2c2a6ff

Location Path

>10.0.0.10>Thesis>Melvin>10.0.0.84>DSL

Log directory

[VSAN] DSL/

Managed Object Reference

vm-410

Memory (MB)

256

Memory expandable

False
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Memory hot add enabled

False

Memory level

normal

Memory limit

Not set

Memory reservation

Not set

Memory shares

2560

Monitor type

release

Name

DSL

Network Adapter 1 Label

Network adapter 1

Network Adapter 1 MAC

00:50:56:ad:61:c2

Network Adapter 1 Summary

VM Network

Notes

Not set

NPIV desired node WWNs

0

NPIV desired port Wwns

0

NPIV is temporary disabled

True

NPIV node World Wide Name

Not set

NPIV on non rdm disks

False

NPIV port world wide name

Not set

NPIV world wide name type

Not set

Number of cpu

1

Number of ethernet cards
Number of virtual disks

1
1

OverallStatus

green

Parent

Not set

Power off operation type

preset

Power State

poweredOn

Record replay enabled

False

Record replay state

inactive

Reset type

preset

Run with debug info

False

Runtime Info boot time

Not set

Runtime Info clean power off

False

Runtime Info fault tolerance state

notConfigured

Runtime info max cpu usage

1393

Runtime info max memory usage

256

Runtime Info memory overhead

75235328

Runtime Info need secondary reason

Not set

Runtime Info number of active MKS connections

1

SCSI bus sharing 1

noSharing

SCSI controller 1

LSI Logic

SCSI controller name 1

SCSI controller 0

Snapshot directory

[VSAN] DSL/

Snapshot power off behavior

powerOff

Snapshot tree locked

False

Snapshots disabled

False

Standby action

powerOnSuspend
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Suspend directory

[VSAN] DSL/

Suspend interval

0

Suspend operation type

preset

Suspend time

Not set

Swap placement

inherit

Template

False

Tools installer mounted

False

Tools status

guestToolsNotRunning

Tools version status

Not set

Type

VirtualMachine

Uncommitted 1

0

Unshared 1

16374876340

Use TCP/IP Offloading

False

UUID

422dd6a1-38e8-1594-c77c-fd4fc5eed7e9

Version

vmx-07

Virtual Disk 1 Disk Mode

persistent

Virtual Disk 1 Is split

No

Virtual Disk 1 Is thin provisioned

No

Virtual Disk 1 Is write through

No

Virtual Disk 1 Label
Virtual Disk 1 Summary

Hard disk 1
15728640 KB

Virtual Disk 1 Summary, GB

15

Virtual MMU usage

automatic

Vm config file

[VSAN] DSL/DSL.vmx

VMCapability is change tracking supported

True

VMCapability is console preferences supported

False

Vmdk File 1

[VSAN] DSL/DSL.vmdk

VMTools after power on

True

VMTools after resume

True

VMTools before guest reboot

False

VMTools before guest shutdown

True

VMTools before guest standby

True

VMTools pending customization

Not set

VMTools sync time with host

False

VMTools tools version

0

VMtools upgrade policy

manual

VMWare Tools

tools not installed

Vmx File

[VSAN] DSL/DSL.vmx

Vmx File Short

DSL.vmx

Will enter BIOS setup during next boot

False

86

Virtualization Security Survey

87

88

